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If one were to yield to what is perhaps dangerous temptation and try
to identify the most potent influences in American legal philosophy in
the twentieth century, three would stand out above the rest. One of
these is almost aggressively indigenous while the other two are more or
less exotic imports. The native element would be that steadily mounting
sociological emphasis, stemming from Holmes, Pound and others,
which was to express itself in a cluster of provocative and often brilliant
writings in the twventies and thirties. If American realism, as it came to
be called, sometimes overreached itself and if some of its philosophical
positions have long since been abandoned or modified, its impact on
American legal thought and education continues to be pervasive. In a
quite different universe of juristic speculation has been the work of the
legal philosopher Hans Kelsen. There has certainly been no school of
American Kelsenians, and in consequence, by the side of the vast if not
always very conscious adherence to realist modes of thinking, the influ-
ence of Kelsen seems superficially to have been small. But the eminence
of Kelsen in European legal thought and the forceful amplitude of his
writing have been such that every American writer of legal philosophy
in the last two decades has felt obliged to take account of his general po-
sition. Of late a second, if somewhat less alien, intrusion must be ac-
knowledged. This newer influence is exemplified in the work of Profes-
t Professor of Law, New York University. B.A. 1948, MA. 1950, Cambridge Universit)
LL.B. 1952, University of Wales; LL.M. 1961, Newv York University. A few paragraphs in
this article are a revised version of some passages which appeared in the chapter on Juris-
prudence written by me in the Annual Survey of American Law for 1965. In prcparing
this article I have benefited from discussions with Professor Hy a n Gross, my colleague at
New York University School of Law, and with Mr. Stephen Wexier, a graduate of the New
York University School of Law, class of 1967.
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sor H. L. A. Hart of Oxford and particularly in his celebrated book,
The Concept of Law, published in 1961. Professor Hart is certainly not
a lonely meteor, for his work in legal philosophy consists of the applica-
tion to questions about law of a general technique of philosophical in-
vestigation, sometimes called linguistic analysis or ordinary-language
philosophy, which has been dominant in England for some time and has
many practitibners in the United States. But Professor Hart was one of
the first to apply this technique to legal questions, and he has done it
with such talent and elegance that his name is justly pre-eminent. His
method has not proved congenial to the main body of opinion in the
United States1 but, as with Kelsen, those who disagree with his approach
have uniformly felt him to be a writer whose work demands discussion,
while a small number of American law professors and teachers of philos-
ophy now write about juristic questions in a manner which owes a good
deal to Professor Hart's example. 2
With some rough propriety the realist movement may be regarded as
one avenue of exploration into the nature of a legal system while the
work of Hart and that of Kelsen may be bracketed as a quite different
type of inquiry. The American realists perceived that the operation of a
modem legal system is dependent on what Professor McDougal has
aptly called a "flow of decisions"3 and that it was therefore high time to
take a hard look at the nature of decision-making under rules. At times
this focus led some realist writers to the excesses of defining law exclu-
sively in terms of decision-making or of denying the possibility that
rules can play any meaningful part in decision-making but, purged of
this exaggeration, the realist movement was and remains an invaluable
invitation to an empirical investigation of the way in which officials ad.
judicate in the context of a legal system.
Both Kelsen and Hart, or so it seems to this writer, have been much
more concerned with identifying aspects of a legal system which distin.
guish it both from human behavior which is not rule-governed and also
from other kinds of human behavior in which rules play a part. In pur-
suing this aim they have concentrated their attention on the logical fea-
tures of prescriptive language and on the structural aspects that give
unity to the prescriptions contained in a legal system. This type of ap-
1. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of Its Use.
fulness, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 1080 (1956); Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth
Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1957).
2. See Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 861 (1966).
3. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82
RECUElL DE CoUas 137, 181 (1953).
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proach has its illuminations and was no doubt necessary as an antibiotic
for the behaviorist virus which American realism was threatening to un-
leash. But it has its own dangers, both in tending to an exotic preoccupa-
tion with the formal structure of legal propositions which are couched
in authoritative generalizations and in obliquely dimming awareness of
the need for a close examination of the business of practical reasoning
within a legal system. Neither Kelsen nor Hart is in the least guilty of
the old charge of believing that judicial decisions are reached by some
kind of formal logic or even by some less formal process of deductive
reasoning. Both are very willing to acknowledge the creative role of the
judge. But Kelsen's interest in this area does not extend beyond the
mere designation of the judge as the appropriate, authoritative agent for
concretizing the superior norm, while Hart's comments about the na-
ture of judicial decision-making seem peripheral to his central concern.4
Professor Hart's work seems to have aroused in a number of Ameri-
can writers a sense of its irrelevance or inappropriateness, as if, though
clearly talented and impressive, it were somehow not directed to issues
which they feel to be vital. Yet, as it seems to this writer, the critics of
Professor Hart have failed to point clearly to what exactly is inadequate
in his presentation. This article will argue that, in the first place, Profes-
sor Hart's elucidation of the concept of law is indeed inadequate in that
it stops short of an examination of the nature of legal reasoning and de-
cision-making and, secondly, that by analyzing why the failure to do this
is critical we can learn something more about the nature of a legal sys-
tem, something which was always implicit in the work of the American
realists although never well articulated by them.
I.
The concept of a legal system has an intimate connection with tie na-
ture of the legal reasoning employed in legal argument and judicial deci-
sion-making. Admittedly, in an analysis of the business of organizing and
regulating human behavior under rules, decision-making is not the only
activity that deserves notice. The framing of new rules, the observation
of rules, the giving of advice and the execution of sanctions are all emi-
nently legal activities in this sense, though it may be observed that in a
functioning legal system all of these activities are carried on with a care-
ful eye to the prospect of adjudication and all are thus influenced and af-
4. H. KELsEN, GNvERAL TaEoRy OF LAW AND STATE 134-35 (19-15); H.L.A. HAx~r. Tin
CoNcu'r oF LAw 121-50 (1961).
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fected by the decision-making process. We could, of course, construct a
model of a legal system which did not include judicial decision-making
-where the rules were perfectly clear, providing unambiguous direc-
tion for all conceivable situations, and where compliance was perfect so
that disputes never arose. But since no society that is at all complex is
likely to be willing or able to operate under such a system, it does seem
proper to characterize decision-making, whether adjudicatory or advi-
sory, as a very important feature of the operation of a legal system. This
is not to say that litigation is the whole of the law but only to insist that
an elucidation of the concept of a legal system is dangerously neglectful
if it fails to furnish a conceptual analysis that properly illuminates the
business of decision-making.
This article will focus on the relation of rules to judicial decision-
making. At the outset, some illumination may be gained by comparing,
as is now often done, the workings of a legal system with playing a game.
Professor Hart, in particular, has made much use of games as models for
gaining insights into the nature of law and, since games are rule-systems,
the analogy is clearly to some extent justified. It may, nevertheless, be
helpful to point out that there are important respects in which the anal-
ogy between playing a game and participating in a legal system breaks
down and these differences may themselves provide an insight to further
the inquiry.
In many games the rules are comparatively simple and are sufficiently
well understood by the players, so that disputes seldom arise and adjudi-
cative decisions are seldom necessary. Thus we find that many games are
commonly played without umpires or referees and that the absence of
such arbiters does not occasion any great difficulty. In some games, such
as tennis, even when umpires are used their task is usually only to make
simple factual decisions such as which side of a line a ball fell on, and
only rarely to interpret the rules. Even in a highly intellectual game
such as chess, referees are rarely used and, when they are employed, they
are seldom called upon to interpret rules. So where official decisions in
games are criticized, as often happens in football or baseball, the criti-
cism usually arises from what is felt to be the official's mistaken percep-
tion of fact and only rarely from a disputed interpretation of the rules.
Again, where game officials must settle disputes, their decisions must
usually be instant. Argument by the parties to the contest is typically
not permitted and indeed may be penalized. There is no appreciable pe-
riod for deliberation and the decision is not supported by reasoned ar-
gument. Rarely is there any appellate procedure. One reason for this is
that an appellate procedure is much more designed for disputed inter-
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pretations of rules or questions about the severity of sanction than for
decisions about disputed facts. Another reason is that the main thing in
playing a game is usually to get on with it. If rules were so complicated
or so obscure that a game had constantly to be held up while the players
referred disputes to experts for deliberation, the primary purposes of di-
version and entertainment would be frustrated. It is more important
that the game should continue than that people should be allowed to ar-
gue, unless of course they are playing an argument-game. There are in-
deed argument and decision games, such as, perhaps, moot courts, but in
them the arguments and decisions are not about rules of the game but
are the game itself.
But a legal system is an ever present regulation of multitudinous as-
pects of life. Its impingement is continuous; it deals with issues vastly
more important than diversion and entertainment. The rules through
which it operates are so numerous and so wide-ranging that the players
cannot know them all and their application must often be in doubt, per-
haps because of ambiguity or vagueness in the rules themselves, perhaps
because of unforeseen or unforeseeable circumstances, and often be-
cause of the contrary conclusions to which we seem to be impelled by
the invocation of more than one rule. In a legal system, the clash of in-
terests is so vital that we can seldom leave the parties to work things out
for themselves. We must have the possibility of resolution by means of
authoritative decision-making. In law we are always playing in a tourna-
ment and we need the officials all the time.
Another important difference between a game and a legal system is
the obligatory character of the latter. It is true that once we have begun
to play a game, there is a sense in which we may be said to have an obli-
gation to comply with the rules. But the obligation exists only while we
are playing the game, and by studied indifference to the rules we may
simply cease to play the game. If while playing chess, I move the rook di-
agonally, I will be corrected and, if I persist, I will no doubt be told that
I am simply not playing chess and my opponent will leave the board.
Even if he should choose to indulge me and to continue to play with me
in some fashion, we would no longer be playing chess, whatever we
might call what we were playing. But nobody leaves the board in the
law-game and breaking the rules does not bring the game to an end, at
least not unless most people do so. We might compare working out a
brand new game with promulgating a legal system for a society living at
the moment in an anarchic state of nature. After inventing the game we
could say, "If you do all these things and observe all these rules, you will
be playing this game." After promulgating the legal system we would say,
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"Some things that you have been doing up to now, you must no longer
do; sometimes you may achieve a certain result only by doing things in a
special way." The point is that while the rules of a game are, among
other things, an invitation to play, a legal system is not an invitation to
play but an obligatory impress on "natural" living. It is true that we can
in some sense opt out of bits of the law-game, for I may say that, al-
though rules have been provided which tell me how to make a valid
will, I just do not care to make a will at all. But we can never opt out of
those large sectors of the legal system which impose duties or ex-
pose us to the legal powers of others and, in practice, the social sacrifice
that would be involved makes it prohibitive to opt out of those areas of
the system which afford us privileges and powers to achieve certain so-
cial ends.
These differences between games and legal systems account for the
different status of the process of adjudication in the two activities. Be-
cause of the vital importance of the interests which may be at stake in le-
gal disputes and because too of the admitted likelihood that in a signifi-
cant number of instances neither of the alternative determinations of a
dispute could be demonstrated to be wrong, we have long insisted that
the parties have an opportunity to argue their cases before a judge who
must in most cases justify his judgment in a reasoned opinion which
may be subjected to further argument in an appellate proceeding. And
because of the obligatory character of law, claims to such full adjudica-
tive procedures are recognized as claims of right. Decision-making about
rule-governed behavior thus acquires a central role in a legal system, a
role for which the game model contains no satisfactory analogue.
Ii.
In recent discussion about the nature of judicial decision-making, at
any rate in the context of statutory interpretation, two apparently rather
dramatically opposed views have been articulated in the celebrated ex-
change between Professor Hart and Professor Fuller in the Harvard
Law Review of 1958. 5 These two views will be briefly outlined as an
introduction to what follows.
Professor Hart raises the simple example of a legal rule which forbids
one to take a vehicle into a public park: "Plainly this forbids an automo.
5. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. RIv. 593
(1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REv. 630 (1958).
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bile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What
about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be called 'vehicles' for the pur-
pose of the rule or not?" 6 He goes on to suggest that general words used
in legal rules, like "vehicle" in the example, have a core of settled mean-
ing, clearly encompassing an automobile, but that there is a surrounding
penumbra of doubtful cases where linguistic usage dictates no answer,
where opposite determinations might both be linguistically defen-
sible, and where the judge must have recourse to considerations of pol-
icy, justice or morality. Since, in the penumbral area, decisions cannot
be demonstrated to be "true" in the sense that a proposition can be true
or false, it might seem that the only reason for preferring one to another
would be its greater approximation to what the law ought to be. In this
sense, Professor Hart suggests, there is a temptation to say that a clear
separation between what the law is and what it ought to be cannot be
made, since the best or most correct statement of a rule of law must be a
statement of what the law on that point should be-a temptation to as-
sert that "the aims, the social policies and purposes to which judges
should appeal if their decisions are to be rational, are themselves to be
considered as part of the law in some suitably wide sense of 'law' which
is held to be more illuminating than that used by the Utilitarians."
This way of talking Professor Hart firmly rejects in a central passage
which merits quoting at length:
If it is true that the intelligent decision of penumbral questions
is one made not mechanically but in the light of aims, purposes,
and policies, though not necessarily in the light of anything we
would call moral principles, is it wise to express this important fact
by saying that the firm utilitarian distinction between what the laiv
is and what it ought to be should be dropped? Perhaps the claim
that it is wise cannot be theoretically refuted for it is, in effect, an
invitation to revise our conception of what a legal rule is. We are
invited to include in the "rule" the various aims and policies in the
light of which its penumbral cases are decided on the ground that
these aims have, because of their importance, as much right to be
called law as the core of legal rules whose meaning is settled. But
though an invitation cannot be refuted, it may be refused and I
would proffer two reasons for refusing this invitation. First, every-
thing we have learned about the judicial process can be expressed
in other less mysterious ways. We can say laws are incurably incom-
plete and we must decide the penumbral cases rationally by refer-
ence to social aims. I think Holmes, who had such a vivid apprecia-
6. Hart, supra note 5, at 607.
7. Id. at 612.
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tion of the fact that "general propositions do not decide concrete
cases," would have put it that way. Second, to insist on the utilitar-
ian distinction is to emphasize that the hard core of settled meaning
is law in some centrally important sense and that even if there are
borderlines, there must first be lines. It this were not so the notion
of rules controlling courts' decisions would be senseless as some of
the "Realists"-in their most extreme moods, and, I think, on bad
grounds-claimed.
By contrast, to soften the distinction, to assert mysteriously that
there is some fused identity between law as it is and as it ought to
be, is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally like those
of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no central element of
actual law to be seen in the core of central meaning which rules
have, that there is nothing in the nature of a legal rule inconsistent
with all questions being open to reconsideration in the light of so.
cial policy. Of course, it is good to be occupied with the penumbra.
Its problems are rightly the daily diet of the law schools. But to be
occupied with the penumbra is one thing, to be preoccupied with it
another. And preoccupation with the penumbra is, if I may say so,
as rich a source of confusion in the American legal tradition as for-
malism in the English.$
Professor Fuller, repudiating Hart's way of talking about statutory in-
terpretation, begins by making the point that Hart misleadingly seems
to imply that interpretation is commonly a matter of the vagueness or
ambiguity of single words.9 It is rather, Fuller suggests, more often a
business of assigning meanings to sentences, paragraphs or even pages of
text. But even if the question should present itself as turning on the in-
terpretation of a single word, the certainty that we may feel about the
propriety of a given interpretation is, in Fuller's view, derived not from
linguistic usage but rather from the clearness of the purpose of the rule,
or perhaps from the circumstance that the answer would be the same no
matter which of several possible purposes underlies the rule. So, on the
latter hypothesis, no matter whether the purpose of Hart's rule prohibit-
ing vehicles is to suppress noise or to prevent air pollution, it would
clearly apply to driving a Cadillac through the park. If a tank were
driven into the park in order to be mounted on a pedestal as a war me-
morial, the decision might be in doubt, not because of any doubt con-
cerning the usage of "vehicle," but rather because of our doubt whether
any conceivable purpose for the rule would require or recommend its
application to this case.
The principal task of statutory interpretation for Professor Fuller is
8. Id. at 614-15.
9. Fuller, supra note 5, at 662.
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thus always a search for purpose. How the search is to be conducted and
what relationship there is between the concepts of law and policy he
does not discuss at any length, though he refers to a series of questions
that should be asked, questions which are very reminiscent of the old
common law principles of statutory interpretation as enunciated in
Heydon's case: 10 "What can this rule be for? What evil does it seek to
avert? What good is it intended to promote?"" He does not consider the
possibility of detecting plausible but divergent purposes.
In this exchange, Hart and Fuller certainly create the impression that
they have sketched two much-opposed general points of view, but there
is a good deal of obscurity about the details of the disagreement. Much
of this obscurity is generated by an excessive emphasis by both dispu-
tants on the concept of a rule in their analyses of judicial decision-mak-
ing, by a failure to embark on a taxonomy of the very different types of
legal rules and by a failure to explore the part that other legal materials
play in statutory interpretation.
In the first place legal rules differ enormously in their concreteness
and particularity. We may talk about a rule that "A will must have two
witnesses" and again about a rule that "Contributory negligence will
defeat the claim of a plaintiff in a negligence suit." But these rules
clearly differ in their generality and in the amount of creative discre-
tionary adjudication that must go into their application. And they may
both be contrasted in these same respects with a principle like "A con-
tract may be illegal if it offends against public policy" or a maxim that
"He who comes to equity must come with clean hands." No precise dis-
tinctions can be made between rules, principles and maxims, but the
terms serve to mark differences of degree in the precision of guides to
decision-making. Rules are fairly concrete guides for decision geared to
narrow categories of behavior and prescribing narrow patterns of con-
duct. Principles are vaguer signals which alert us to general considera-
tions that should be kept in mind in deciding disputes under rules. So
we decide under rules but in the light of principles. A maxim is a prin-
ciple that has been distilled in a traditional, aphoristic form. In mar-
ginal cases rules may be applied in the light of principles, but some-
times, when no concrete rule is present and relevant, a case must be
decided by a direct application of principle or maxim to the facts with-
out the interposition of a more concrete rule.
The first step in any discussion of how issues of policy enter into deci-
10. 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584).
11. Fuller, supra note 5, at 665.
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sion-making should be an examination of how these issues are often very
much embedded in these different layers of material used in legal rea-
soning. When is a recourse to considerations of policy in applying a rule
a reference to extra-legal materials and when is it, at least in part, a ref-
erence to a more general legal notion in the form of another rule or
principle or maxim? Is there some criterion by which we must say that
rules are law and principles or maxims are not law, if this, indeed, is
what Professor Hart might be taken to imply?
It will be best to illustrate this problem with an example. The En-
glish Wills Act requires that a will be signed "at the foot or end."12 Let
us suppose that a will has been written on the outer sides of a cardboard
box and signed on the detachable lid. Here there is certainly no initial
difficulty in perceiving what rule is immediately relevant. This is not a
case of even an apparent lacuna in the law, for we are at once brought to
consider whether the facts described can be taken to satisfy the rule that
a will be signed at the foot or end. If we consider why a legislature
should require that a will be signed at the foot or end thereof, a number
of possible explanations come to mind. Some would be fanciful, such as
an esthetic desire to achieve symmetry or elegance in the document.
Another view might be that, although it does not much matter where
a will is signed, it is desirable for the sake of uniformity and consistency
to have some standard requirement, though it would do just as well
to require that a will be signed at the beginning. Another and perhaps
the most obvious view would be that a signature at the end of the docu-
ment is the surest sign of authenticity and minimizes the possibility of
fraudulent additions to the document. Requiring signature at the foot
would not be the only way to further such a policy, for one might pro-
vide that the will could be signed at the beginning but that a double
line in red ink must be drawn to signify the end of the testamentary
provisions.
But in this case the task of interpretation need not begin with such a
shuffling of possible explanations of the rule, for an amending statute
elaborates the meaning of "foot or end thereof" by providing that the
signature shall be sufficient if it is "so placed at or after, or following, or
under, or beside, or opposite to the end of the will, that it shall be ap-
parent on the face of the will that the testator intended to give effect by
such his signature to the writing signed as his will."13 Whatever policy
may have been inherent in the somewhat terse original rule is unques-
12. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict. c. 26, § 9.
13. Wills Act Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24, § 1.
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tionably amplified by this provision of the amending statute. Moreover,
a little research into the English case law reveals that the amending act
was designed to nullify earlier strict interpretations of the original rule
and, by including such words as "under, or beside, or opposite to the
end of the will," to introduce some relaxation in interpretation to ac-
commodate the expressed overriding purpose that the signature clearly
indicated the testator's intent "to give effect by such his signature to the
writing signed as his will."
We thus begin with a simple rule which is reasonably concrete in its
key terms "foot or end." In the course of time this rule gives rise to dif-
ficulties and is filled out by a more elaborate, policy-charged explana-
tion. It is very significant that the clause in the amending statute when
read in full is rather like a discursive interpretative essay.14 It does not
seem easy to talk about it as a "rule." It is more like a tactical manual
for applying rules, in the sense that it contains a supervisory statement
of the end or purpose to be aimed at and a series of illustrative sub-rules
designed to indicate how the original rule should be interpreted to serve
that purpose. This kind of very elementary situation immediately poses
difficulties for any concept of a rule which does not take account of the
diversity of policy intrusions. We are dealing here with a clearly bind-
ing and authoritative direction to judges, issuing immediately from the
sovereign legislature, on how they are to work with and interpret an-
other rule of the system. It would be artificial and unreal to say (and pre-
14. The full clause in the amending statute runs:
Where by the Wills Act, 1837, it is enacted, that no will shall be valid unless it
shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by some other person in
his presence, and by his direction; Every will shall, so far only as regards the position
of the signature of the testator, or of the person signing for him as aforesaid, be
deemed to be valid within the said enactment, as explained by this Act, if the signa-
ture shall be so placed at or after, or following, or under, or beside, or opposite to
the end of the will, that it shall be apparent on the face of the will that the testator
intended to give effect by such his signature to the writing signed as his will; and no
such will shall be affected by the circumstance that the signature shall not follow or
be immediately after the foot or end of the will, or by the circumstance that a blank
space shall intervene between the concluding word of the will and the signature, or
by the circumstance that the signature shall be placed among the words of the
testimonium clause or of the clause of attestation, or shall follow or be after or under
the clause of attestation, either with or without a blank space intervening, or shall
follow or be after, or under, or beside the names or one of the names of the sub-
scribing witnesses, or by the circumstance that the signature shall be on a side or
page or other portion of the paper or papers containing the will whereon no clause
or paragraph or disposing part of the will shall be written above the signature, or
by the circumstance that there shall appear to be sufficient space on or at the bottom
of the preceding side or page or other portion of the same paper on which the will is
written to contain the signature; and the enumeration of the above circtmstances
shall not restrict the generality of the above enactment; but no signature under the
said Act or this Act shall be operative to give effect to any disposition or direction
which is underneath or which follows it, nor shall it give effect to any disposition or
direction inserted after the signature shall be made. Id.
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sumably Professor Hart would not want to say) that only the original
"foot or end" rule is law and that the amending clause must be thought
of as "interpretative material." Such a description would encounter two
important objections: first, the strangeness of refusing to call something
law when it is a fairly typical statutory section, and, second, the almost
impossible task of establishing a criterion for what is law in terms of the
concreteness and simplicity of the directive. The point here is that
sometimes more or less discursive policy directives are not in the least
extra-legal, but are law in the most immediate sense of being embodied
in statutory sections, An incidental point is that Professor Fuller is on
solid ground when he suggests that Hart's thesis is mistaken insofar as it
may be taken to imply that statutory interpretation is typically a matter
of classifying border-line instances of "key words." As Professor Fuller
suggests, as the Wills Act Amendment Act example reveals, and as any
casual reading of a random volume of the law reports will confirm, it is
much more often a matter of fixing the "drift" of a paragraph or distil
ling the conjunctive effect of many sections or clauses.
The illustration so far has revealed how, in looking for the policy in
the light of which to interpret a statutory rule, a court need sometimes
look no further than another section of the same statute or some other
statutory enactment. But of course even our amending statute does not
logically determine the solution of the problem where the will was
signed on the lid of a cardboard box, Indeed, it may render the solution
more difficult, for "at or after, or following, or under, or beside, or oppo.
site to the end of the will" is more vague and complex than "foot or
end," and the purposive direction that it should be apparent that the
testator intended to give effect to the writing by his signature is not de-
terminative of borderline cases such as our example might be thought
to be. Here, then, if we use Professor Hart's terms, the judge is still out-
side the core and in the penumbra, and must look about him for what
help he can find. How might he proceed? In upholding such a will a
court might stress the underlying policy of probate law that wherever
possible effect should be given to the wishes of the deceased, and that,
therefore, where other arguments are nicely balanced, the benefit of
doubts should be given to the document. Alternatively a judge might
say that sloppiness in the drawing of such vital documents as testamen-
tary provisions must be curbed and further that future litigation will be
best discouraged by a comparatively strict policy of construction which
will invalidate the present document. It is true that the Wills Act
Amendment Act was passed because of what was felt to be an overly lit.
eral and rigid series of decisions under the "foot or end" provision, but
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this legislative history, while effecting a reversal of certain decisions, does
not necessarily preclude strict-leaning constructions under the new pro-
visions. Courts may still simply take different views about whether the
position of the signature does or does not make it apparent on the face
of the will that the testator intended by his signature to give effect to the
writing. Again, it may be that there are three decisions in a court of
equivalent jurisdiction to the effect that wills made on cardboard boxes
and signed on the lid cannot be admitted to probate. The judge is not
technically bound by these decisions, but in order to further the goal of
consistency in the law he may hold the document to be invalid.
In all these instances the court is resorting to what may be called pol-
icy notions. Are these notions extra-legal? They have all certainly been
expressed frequently in court opinions, and the notion that, wherever
possible, the wishes of the testator should be given effect is a recurring
theme in probate judgments. The ideal of consistency in the law with its
corollary prescription that precedents are not lightly to be disturbed is
also a hallowed theme in judicial opinions. Even if we cannot appropri-
ately refer to any of these ideas as legal "rules," they are most certainly
a part of the stock of ideas which by observation we know influence
judges in deciding cases. How do they differ from the directive ex-
pressed in the section of the Wills Act Amendment Act? Most obviously
by not themselves being contained in a statute. But what, then, if
they were contained in a statute? What if the Wills Act contained
a general directive to judges that in interpreting the statute they
should lean in favor of giving effect to the wishes of the testator? Or
what if a general statute directed judges to give great weight in constru-
ing statutes to the authority of precedents and to disturb them only
when there are very urgent reasons? General statutory policy directives
of this kind are by no means unknown; indeed, they have become very
common. 15 If we concede that general statements of interpretive policy
15. Among the very many instances the following are random examples. "The Com-
munist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, the recent successes
of Communist methods in other countries, and the nature and control of the world
Communist movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the tecurity of the
United States and to the existence of free American institutions, and make it necessary
that Congress.. . enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence of such worldwide
conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United
States." 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1964); "lt is the purpose of this Act (1) to discharge
more effectively the obligations of the United States under the International Opium
Convention of 1912, and the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931; (2) to promote the public health and the general
welfare; (5) to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in opium poppies; and (4) to
safeguard the revenue derived from taxation of opium and opium products." 56 Stat. 1045,
21 U.S.C. § 188 (1964).
423
The Yale Law Journal
are sometimes to be found in statutes and sometimes reiterated in judi-
cial opinions, we have very little warrant in a common-law system for
classifying the statutory expressions as law and denying this title to ones
which, although not contained in a statute, are traditionally reiterated
by judges.
Thus, if Professor Hart wants to say that policy directives contained
in statutes are law because they are really very open-textured rules di-
recting judges to decide cases in the light of the designated policy, he
would also have to say that wherever judicial decisions have enunciated a
policy to be considered in deciding a particular type of case, there is in
fact a precedential rule to the effect that this policy must be taken into
account by subsequent courts deciding cases of that type. Though it is
conceptually possible to put the matter this way, to do so is to make non-
sense of the sharp distinction between rules and policy to which Hart at-
taches so much importance. Hart's rule-centered model of law therefore
does not seem to account for all the materials which we would want to
call law; it certainly does not include all the materials actually employed
in legal reasoning and judicial decision. And most important, it diverts
attention from a study of the part played by principles and maxims of
policy in the decision-making process which produces the final text of
the law.
One interesting feature of these principles or maxims, as shown in the
Wills Act example, is that they may appear to conflict with each other.
It is inconceivable, except by a gross oversight which would have to be
rectified, that a statute might say in one place that a will must be signed
at the foot or end thereof and in another place that a will may be signed
in the middle of the testamentary provisions. So legal directives which
are sufficiently concrete to be called rules cannot conflict and remain
valid. We might express this by saying that there is a superior rule that
requires the resolution of conflicts between such concrete rules by a de-
termination that only one of them is valid. But two principles may lead
toward different outcomes in a dispute where the fact situation is not in
doubt and yet both remain valid. In this respect legal principles are like
proverbs. It is elementary to point out that "Many hands make light
work" seems quite contrary to the admonition "Too many cooks spoil
the broth," though, of course, both may be very sensible pieces of advice
in different situations. When both are offered to a person in a dilemma,
they may well leave him in a state of confusion, though even then they
perform the valuable task of alerting him to different aspects of the situ-
ation that he should consider carefully. So it is with legal principles or
maxims. In the example of the cardboard-box will, the notion that
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wherever possible the wishes of the testator should be given effect may
seem to conflict directly with the notion that uniformity should be re-
quired in solemn documents or with the principle that decisions should
be consistent with precedent. In practice these principles serve to alert
the judge to policy factors that he must weigh in coming to a decision.
Though, since they conflict, they cannot solve the problem, they never-
theless all contribute to the process of rational decision-making by mak-
ing manifest considerations which an opinion must discuss if it is to be
convincing.
All the policy factors so far noticed as relevant to a decision in the will
example were to a greater or lesser degree formally crystallized in legal
doctrine, either by being expressly embodied in a statute or by being
sufficiently reiterated by judges to achieve the status of legal maxims or
principles. We are indeed familiar with the phrase "principles of statu-
tory interpretation" and, as has been shown, it is often only accidental
whether these principles themselves achieve statutory form or live more
loosely as pervasive judicial ideas.
But suppose we add to the hypothetical the circumstance that to
strike down the will would result in depriving a crippled eight-year-old
child of all financial support. This seems at first to be an appeal to char-
ity or compassion that cannot at all be thought of as a legal idea. But
even here we can find in the storehouse of legal aphorisms something
that has a bearing, even if a negative one. Judges have often said that
hard cases make bad law. This aphorism expresses the idea that to de-
part from the principle of consistency solely out of compassion may
carry great dangers for the future course of the law. "Hard cases make
bad law" is certainly not a legal maxim in the clear sense of "He who
comes to equity must come with clean hands," but neither can it clearly
be dismissed as an extra-legal notion.
These examples reveal that in the edifice of argumentation in which
a legal problem is debated and in the structure of reasoning by which a
judicial opinion supports a judgment, there is constant movement be-
tween different layers of material. Some of this material is concrete and
particular, though still perhaps vague or ambiguous at its edges, as with
our rule about the signature at the foot or end of the will. Some is much
more general, supervisory and policy-charged, as with the notion that
wherever possible the wishes of the testator should be effected. Some is
formally legal in the strongest sense as with the interpretive directions
in the Wills Act Amendment Act. Some is less formally stamped with
authority but yet remains in an important sense doctrinal, as with the
principle that generally respect should be accorded to precedent. Some
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has only faint marks of legal formality, as with the notion that hard
cases make bad law. But we are dealing in every instance with the more
or less concrete, the more or less formally legal. To attempt to draw
sharp lines between law and policy or between legal and non-legal mate-
rial in this context sadly oversimplifies a complicated problem.
But what if our experience with the particular judge in question af-
fords us knowledge that he is in the habit of taking bribes? We have re-
ferred earlier to "the stock of ideas which by observation we know influ-
ence judges in deciding cases."' 6 How then can we discriminate between
the impact on a judge of the interpretive directions in the Wills Act
Amendment Act and, on the other hand, the influence of a bribe? It is
important to stress that the analysis offered here does insist on the need
for drawing a distinction between these two phenomena. Otherwise
statements about the nature of law and inquiries into legal reasoning
would, indeed, become matters only of what judges do and we would be
back with the excesses of early American realism. What we are con-
cerned with in our analysis of the decision-making process is the struc-
ture of argumentation, which is intimately connected with what judges
do but is certainly not the same as what they do. The philosophical in-
quiry about legal reasoning is markedly different from a psychological
investigation into which influences in fact determine decisions or even
into which arguments are in fact most likely to be acceptable or convinc-
ing. The most obvious point to make in this connection is that the
judge's taking a bribe is not an argument at all. It is an explanation for
his judgment in the sense that the bribe is a motivation, but it is not a
reason in the sense of a justification that could be openly stated in his
opinion. It is not therefore an instance of legal reasoning: it does not
find any place among those arguments that, by consensus of the partici.
pants in the system, are regarded as legitimate materials for building a
structure of persuasion.
From the point of view of the attorney who is conscientiously con-
cerned only with advising a client about the probable outcome of litiga-
tion in which the client is or may become involved, it is certainly true
that the personality of the judge, including his propensity to take bribes,
is a consideration that cannot be ignored. But it would be strange to
view the judge's tendency to behave criminally as a part of the law. To
do this would be to accept some of the more extreme realist contentions
that the concept of law has no meaning apart from a prediction of what
judges will do. Even this extreme position provides some helpful insight
16. P. 423 supra.
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into the workings of a legal system in the limited sense that, if all of the
judges all of the time or most of the judges most of the time were known
to take bribes, it would be increasingly difficult to maintain that a legal
system existed. But where there is a generally accepted legal system it is
centrally necessary to maintain a distinction between a structure of ac-
ceptable argumentation and the intrusion of corrupt motivation. That
the bribing of the judge is totally extraneous to the law of the case can
be demonstrated by pointing to the fact that a judgment procured by
bribery can nevertheless be couched in the form of a scholarly and per-
suasive opinion which succeeds in enlisting the support or agreement of
the profession. This is not of course a plea for ignoring the element of
bribery when it can be shown to have occurred. The motivation of a ve-
nal judge is quite properly a ground for his dismissal and usually for the
reopening of a proceeding. But to say that a judge has been bribed is
quite different from saying that his arguments are defective, and the two
statements should not be confused. There may be acceptable legal rea-
sons for a judgment for which, in cold fact, the explanation is bribery.
But philosophical study of legal reasoning is not concerned with motiva-
tion, which of course remains a perfectly proper and perhaps fruitful
field of inquiry for sociologists and psychologists.
III.
Motivation and reasoning, then, are two different concepts. We are
concerned hfe with some of the ways in which policy can enter into le-
gal reasoning. One unfortunate circumstance to be noticed here is the
tendency to speak of "law and policy" as if these were two realms of dis.
course between which travel is possible but only with the usual formali-
ties of passport and frontier. This artificial dichotomy has been perhaps
the most barren legacy of Kelsen's "pure science of Law." The complex
intertwining of prescription and policy in legal material and the infinite
number of possible ways in which prescriptive utterances may be min-
gled with policy declarations have not so far received analysis.
A simple example may help. Parents may lay down a rule for a child
that he shall not watch television more than one hour a day. A situation
arises in which the child knows he will not be able to watch television at
all on the next day and so requests permission to watch for two hours to-
day in compensation. The proper parental decision is debatable. A lit-
eral interpretation of the original rule would seem to prescribe a re-
fusal, though it would not do great violence to the terms employed to
hold that "one hour a day" means "not more than an average of one
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hour a day over a period of a week," or something of the sort. The cor-
rect decision would clearly depend on the policy behind the rule. It
might be that viewing for more than one hour in any single day is
thought to be damaging to the child's eyes. It might be that too much
viewing is regarded as culturally demoralizing. It might be that watch-
ing for more than one hour a day is thought to leave the child insuffi-
cient time for other important activities. If the policy reflects concern
about eyesight, the response should be negative; but if it is grounded in
one of the other two concerns, the correct decision might well be affir-
mative, since the child will not be watching television at all on the next
day. In this simple situation we seem to have a paradigm of Professor
Hart's dichotomy between rule and policy, though even here it should
be noted that decision-making hardly seems to be a matter of investigat-
ing the penumbra of meaning of a single word.
But suppose the rules were drafted or presented to the child rather
differently and ran something like this. "You must spend two hours
every evening doing your homework and one hour taking fresh air or
exercise. Therefore it will be necessary to restrict you to one hour of
television a day." The principal rule now appears to be one about home-
work and exercise and the rule about television is relegated to an ancil-
lary status. And yet of course we might alternatively describe the pre.
scription as a rule about television viewing which is explained by a
statement of policy about doing homework and taking exercise. The ref-
erence to homework and exercise is in one light a purely prescriptive
rule but in another light it is a policy statement that illuminates another
rule. The example can be carried a step further. The rule that two
hours each day must be spent at homework and one on fresh air and ex-
ercise is not a completely unambiguous declaration of a unique policy.
It is most obviously seen as an attempt to concretize an ideal of mens
sana in corpore sano, but this is so general a statement as to be almost
vacuous until we inquire whether the rules entail any departure from
the previous regimen. If we are told that under the earlier regulations
only one hour was devoted to homework and two to fresh air and exer-
cise, the new rules appear to reflect a policy of greater emphasis on aca-
demic study. If under the old regulations no specific time at all was pre-
scribed for fresh air and exercise while three hours a day were allotted to
homework, quite the contrary policy would seem to be indicated. Both
these contrary policies could of course be subsumed under the general
maxim, mens sana in corpore sano, for they both seek the same result by
redressing excessive emphasis on one or the other aspects in the past.
Suppose now that the regulations do not offer any detailed directives
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about how much time is to be spent at homework or taking fresh air or
exercise or watching teleision but merely state that in the division of
the child's time between these activities a judicious balance is to be
maintained so as best to realize the ideal of mens sana in corpore sano.
This now becomes the primary prescriptive rule, whereas in the earlier
expression it was not a prescriptive rule at all but only a general policy
notion, whether express or inarticulate. As these examples show, one
rule's policy can be another policy's rule. There are many possible ar-
rangements, many ways of achieving regulation in which prescriptive
content and policy content can be more or less concrete and more or
less vague and certainly more or less intertwvined.
None of this complexity is in the least revealed by Professor Hart's
simple dichotomy between "rule" and "policy." Hart gives us a view of
statutory interpretation which apparently contemplates only two alter-
natives. In the first the case falls squarely within the "core" meaning of
the words enshrining the rule, and no difficulty arises. We might ob-
serve that in such situations litigation is probably rare. In the second
case the facts fall within an area where the words of the rule do not
clearly govern, and here the judge must go outside the core of legal ma-
terial and draw on notions of policy, morality and justice. The structure
of legal reasoning is not so simple. The process of statutory interpreta-
tion or, indeed, any form of judicial decision-making is more typically a
rummaging through layers of material in which prescription and policy
are more or less express and more or less vague. The material used in
this argumentation and decision-making will sometimes have a sharply
legal character, as where it is a statutory clause; sometimes a more dif-
fused legal character, as where it amounts to a general common-law doc-
trine, a principle or maxim; sometimes only a vaguely legal character, as
where it is no more than a reiterated judicial idea.
The whole dichotomy between "law" and "policy" is centrally mis-
conceived in its very implication that these are two disparate entities. It
involves a quite artificial notion of "pure prescription" which is per-
haps maintainable with respect to isolated orders but not with respect
to the general rules of a legal system. The isolated command to a child
"Go to bed by seven o'clock this evening" is very different from a gen-
eral rule that the child shall go to bed by seven o'clock every night. The
deliberate, planning aspects of laying down a general rule for a general
course of conduct necessarily involve policy in the sense that the ephem-
eral wish behind an isolated command does not. For this reason it is in
practice inevitable that collections of long-range general prescriptions,
of which a legal system is the paradigm, should be themselves shot
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through at different levels with expressions of policy, though it is of
course not necessary that the statements or reflections of policy should
be complete or consistent.
If Professor Hart's examination of the connection between rule and
policy is defective, the analysis offered by Professor Fuller also has unac-
ceptable aspects. It is certainly preferable to the Hart approach in per-
ceiving that the purposive qualities of judicial decision-making cannot
be properly elucidated in terms of occasional forays outside the realm of
rules into the realm of policy. Professor Fuller recognizes that the no.
tion of purposive interpretation cannot be so easily divorced from an
elucidation of the rule itself. But, unfortunately, he has expressed this
important perception in an overly narrow and overly mysterious man-
ner by seeming to suggest that "purpose" is somehow immanent in a
rule so that each rule has its own true purpose which has to be uncov-
ered. One can agree with Professor Hart that it is less mysterious to
speak of rules being interpreted in the light of purposes. But at this
point it is necessary to insist that the purposes of which we speak are
sometimes partly entwined in the rule itself, for policy notions may be
more or less revealed and more or less embedded in prescriptive lan-
guage, may be sometimes discoverable in other rules of the system and
sometimes in principles, maxims and doctrines, so that purposes are of-
ten at least half manifest in legal material itself.
The process of legal reasoning is thus one of deploying a wide range
of acceptable arguments the scope of which blurs any answer to the
question of what is and what is not law. If courts are generally very will-
ing to listen to (though not necessarily to be convinced by) the argu-
ment that a certain interpretation of a statute would lead to a grave in-
justice, why should we not regard the argument from injustice as a legal
one? Certainly it has a different status from the argument that the court
should decide against the plaintiff because he is ugly. Does it, on the
other hand, stand on any different footing from the argument that a
court should adopt a certain interpretation because there are earlier au-
thoritative decisions which hold that way? It would not suffice to say that
the latter is a legal argument because courts must be persuaded by it
while the argument from injustice is only one that they may listen to, for
courts have frequently brushed aside precedent and declared openly
that for reasons of justice they will create a new rule. Nor can we say
that one argument is to be classified as legal and the other not because
observation leads us to believe that the one is as a matter of fact more
likely to succeed than the other. This is often not a determination that
can be made and, in any case, the discussion is not about what argu.
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ments are in fact most likely to succeed but about which ones are accept-
able in the sense that they will be listened to and that an obligation will
usually be felt to rebut them if they are to be rejected. The idea of ac-
ceptable argument here is thus linked intimately with the ideas of audi-
ence and dialogue. In this way legal argument is very like moral argu-
ment and the everyday business of prudent decision-making in personal
affairs. But in the legal context the audience is a specialized one with
particular craft techniques and traditions which impose a more obvious
hierarchy of cogency on arguments than is the case with everyday practi-
cal reasoning. Arguments about injustice, hardship and the like are
quite acceptable in the legal sphere, but as legal arguments they may
have to yield to the plain meaning of a statute or to the weight of a ven-
erable precedent in cases where they would have carried the day in a
moral argument. Where the meaning of a statute is not plain, or where
precedent is not massed, such arguments are more likely to succeed. But
the arguments used, listened to and sometimes accepted as persuasive in
legal reasoning certainly embrace a wide field of arguments also em-
ployed in moral discussion and practical reasoning.
The upshot is that the whole distinction between which rules can be
identified as "valid" and which cannot, to which the positivists attach so
much importance, is of little help in an analysis of legal argument and
decision-making. It is of little help because legal argument has to do
with many concepts other than rules, and to say that a proposition can-
not be formally identified as a valid rule of the system is therefore not to
say anything about whether it is appropriate and usable in legal debate.
Professor Hart's stigmatizing of views which confuse what the law is and
what the law ought to be is not in point here, for what is being asserted
is that the character of legal reasoning in the decision-making process is
such that, though indeed there may be a difference between what the
law is and what the law ought to be, the law itself is a collection of inter-
woven prescriptive and purposive statements which we marshall and de-
ploy in the adjudication of disputes and also in the tendering of advice.
Does this involve revising our concept of a rule in a "mysterious" fash-
ion, which was the tendency that Professor Hart justifiably castigated in
Professor Fuller's views? It certainly involves asserting that rules often
combine with their prescriptive elements more or less incomplete pur-
posive revelations which are used in conjunction with other material in
the interpretation of the rule, but it is difficult to see what is mysterious
about this or what generally accepted concept of a rule it is taken to be
revising.
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IV.
Must the foregoing discussion lead us to revise any features of the
modern analytical positivist position in jurisprudence? A comment on
this question must open with some reflections on the difference between
an investigation of the concept of law and an investigation of the nature
of legal reasoning.
The now hallowed game analogy may be of use here. If we are inter-
ested in, say, cricket we are interested because it is a human activity. No-
body would care much about the rules of cricket unless people played
the game. Of course, even if no one played, the rules would exist as a set
of normative statements on paper or as the content of someone's mind.
But rules of cricket are in fact of interest as a framework for understand-
ing cricket activity or "cricketing." Now any full description of the
cricket activity would have to include a reference to umpires and their
decision-making role. We might want to add that cricket can be played
without umpires, in which case the players have to make for themselves
the kinds of decisions that umpires usually make as to whether a fielder
caught the ball fairly, whether a batsman is out leg before wicket or run
out, and so on. Thus, though the prescriptive rules of cricket may be
stated without any express reference to an institutionalized decision-
making process, cricket activity is impossible without such a process,
whether conducted formally by umpires or informally by the players
themselves. The necessity to refer to the process of decision-making in
one's description and elucidation thus depends on whether the object of
inquiry is the cricket activity or merely the existence of a set of norma-
tive prescriptions on paper.
In our investigation of the concept of law we are likewise interested
in a rule system primarily because it has a significant effect on behavior
and not merely because it is a collection of prescriptive sounding utter-
ances. It is true that, as Professor Hart has pointed out, rule-governed
or rule-oriented behavior has its own distinctive character in that it pre-
supposes an ideology or attitude of acceptance, so that to understand it
fully we must refer to phenomena more complex than statements of
what people habitually do or predictions of what will probably be done.
We must take account of attitudes and practices in referring to rules as
standards for justification, for criticism and condemnation.'7 But it is
precisely this social phenomenon of acceptance and application that lifts
a system of rules out of the printed page and makes it a system of law.
17. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961).
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Once this social operativeness is envisaged we are confronted with the
business of decision-making and the whole task of reasoning about con-
duct in the light of rules. Moreover, as we have suggested earlier, deci-
sion-making plays a much more conspicuous and important part in the
operation of a legal system than in the playing of a game. For the busi-
ness of legal reasoning in the sense of making judgments about conduct
in the light of rules is not confined to judicial decision-making. It is a
vital task of counsel in arguing cases before a court and of the attorney
in advising a client, and, indeed, must be an important concern of the
legislature in framing a statute which it knows will then immediately
become a part of the material to be used in the adjudicatory and advi-
sory processes.
We must therefore distinguish between different inquiries. If the
question to be asked is whether some explanation of the nature of legal
reasoning and decision-making is important to describe how a legal sys-
tem functions, the answer must be affirmative. If instead we are inter-
ested in laying down a set of necessary conditions for the existence of a
legal system, then we must include a process of decision-making as the
essential link between prescriptive rules and the determination of dis-
putes, between rules on paper and rules in action. For the concept of a le-
gal system is itself a concept of rules in action and not of rules on paper.
But if a different question is put and we ask not "What is a legal sys-
tern?" but "What is a valid law?" some further comment is necessary.
Professor Dworkin has written, "What, in general, is a good reason for
decision by a court of law? This is the question of jurisprudence; it has
been asked in an amazing number of forms of which the classic 'What is
Law?' is only the briefest.""' The implication seems to be that to eluci-
date the notion of what constitutes a good reason for decision by a court
of law would be to proffer a good definition of a valid law. But the con-
cept of a valid law does not appear to be at all the same as that of a good
reason for a decision. Decisions by a court are not characteristically based
on a reason but rather on an edifice of reasoning; they are not supported
by separating valid from invalid rules (which would be so simple a task
that disputes need never arise), but by arriving at an interpretation of
materials generally acknowledged to be relevant in a fashion generally
acknowledged to be acceptable. No judge was ever put in much of a
quandary by the difficulty of deciding whether a statute emanates from
his own jurisdiction or another. Certainly the identification of rules as
belonging to the system is a subject worthy of philosophical analysis, but
18. Dworkin, Wasserstrorn: The Judicial Decision, 75 Entucs 47 (1964).
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as a practical matter it occasions no difficulty whatever and is scarcely
worth the attention that has been paid to it by the analytical jurists.
The analytical positivists, including pre-eminently Kelsen and Hart,
have of course advanced an analysis of the validity of legal rules for pur-
poses more ambitious than the mundane task of distinguishing between,
say, English and French law. They have claimed that an explanation of
the validity of the rules of a system in terms of their derivation from a
Grundnorm (Kelsen)19 or from a rule of recognition (Hart)20 contains a
valuable elucidation of the concept of a legal system. Such a construct
is, indeed, a valuable analysis of the concept of obligation as it functions
within a legal system and, as such, it is an important contribution to the
general philosophy of law. But it is not a construct that is of much prac-
tical value for an understanding of the special ways in which a legal sys-
tem implements its prescriptions, and it is thus somewhat remote from a
jurisprudence that could be illuminating for the lawyer.
We might take the example of two very similar forms of the same
game, such as, in England, Rugby Union football and Rugby League
football. These are so recognizably similar that for many purposes we
think and speak of them both as Rugby football. But there are many
practical reasons why we often need to distinguish between them, such
as the circumstance that Rugby Union is purely amateur while Rugby
League is played professionally. In making such a distinction to an in-
quirer we would certainly refer to a difference in rules which could be
identified by a designation of the different governing bodies of the two
games. If we stopped with such an explanation we would leave the in-
quirer only half enlightened and we probably would wish to tell him
more. We would want to tell him that Rugby League is an offshoot from
an original uniform game of Rugby; that it was in some sense a revolu-
tionary breakaway prompted by a desire to modify some of the substan-
tive rules of the game and also to license professional playing; and that
in practice it is played mostly in one area of the north of England. In
this way our explanation of the differences between the two games
would be rather like an explanation of the differences between the ju-
ridical orders of, say, Spain and Mexico.
When we are dealing, then, with two varieties of the same game and
if we can assume that the inquirer has a general knowledge of the com-
mon nature of the two varieties, a reference to the existence of two dif-
ferent basic rules of recognition can certainly supply useful informa-
tion, though, as we have seen from the Rugby example, a certain
19. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 115-23 (1953).
20. H.L.A. HART, THE CoNcEPT OF LAw, 97-120 (1961).
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amount of historical and sociological information is still necessary to en-
large the understanding. Now if we wanted to distinguish Rugby foot-
ball (either variety) from chess we might also begin by pointing to dif-
ferent rules of recognition. To stop at this point would, however, convey
very little information, for it would in itself say nothing about the im-
portant differences of substance, such as that Rugby is a game of physical
movement and body contact while chess is a sedentary game of intel-
lectual exercise. To know this the inquirer must be told about the con-
tent of the rules, to which he may indeed be led by an explanation of
the different rules of recognition. But a statement couched only in terms
of rules of recognition would be positively misleading in its implicit
suggestion that Rugby and chess are the same kind of human activity. In
the sense that they are both games this is true, but the inquirer may
know this already and the type of elucidation that is practically impor-
tant is left unprovided.
Similarly, the concept of a basic norm or fundamental rule of recogni-
tion is a useful designation of the unifying feature that enables us to re-
gard one system of law as a single and unique set of obligations, but it
tells us nothing about the special feature of law as an obligatory system
that functions through a complex set of decision-making procedures. If
one of the striking features of chess when contrasted with Rugby foot-
ball is its sedentary and intellectual character, then one of the striking
features of law when contrasted with any game is the centrality of its
elaborate decision-making process. Structured presentations of the no-
tion of validity are unassailable in their illumination of the concept of
obligation, but a preoccupation with them results in a lack of sufficient
emphasis on the decision-making aspects of a legal system. Just as many
important special features of chess are not revealed by describing it as a
rule system descended from a Grundnorm, in the same way important
special features of a legal system remain hidden by such a presentation.
When we turn to the type of rule system that we call law a further
point of importance must be made. The rule book of a game tells us
how the game is to be played. But the rule book of a legal system tells us
only something about how the game is played. The "valid rules," by
which both Kelsen and Hart seem to mean chiefly the prescriptive and
power-creating rules, sketch directive outlines for private and official be-
havior but tell us little or nothing of the vital process by which the rules
are used and applied in decision-making. Now with respect to games this
matters very little, for, as we have seen, adjudicative decision-making
under rules is of minimal importance in game activity. The rules of a
game are to be used in action by players seeking diversion or providing
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a spectacle. Their primary thrust is not regulatory in the way that a le-
gal system is, where a very important additional purpose of the rules is
to guide adjudicative officials in making decisions. Any representation
of the nature of a legal system as a rule edifice is thus much less illumi-
nating than a similar description of a game, for it contains no hint at all
of how rules are used in legal activity.
We might imagine a chess school, but we would contemplate its task
as being to teach players how to play well and not how to make decisions
about settling disputes under the rules of chess. The rules of chess may
be learned perhaps in less than an hour, but one might still play very
badly and the business of learning chess is that of learning how to oper-
ate within the rules in the best tactical and strategic manner. Playing
chess badly is not usually a matter of being in breach of the rules and
certainly not of acting in such a way that another person will make a dis-
advantageous judgment about one's behavior. But from the viewpoint
of the citizen, playing the law-game badly means precisely acting in such
a way that someone else will make a disadvantageous judgment with re-
spect to one's behavior. Learning to be a lawyer is therefore a matter of
learning how to advise people about what judgments are likely to be
made on their behavior and learning how to influence those judgments
by operating within an acceptable structure of argument.
The concept of a valid rule has some value in indicating a series of le-
gitimate starting blocks for the adjudicatory performance. But the mod-
em positivist elucidation of the nature of law has suffered from a refusal
to go much beyond the question of how these starting blocks are to be
found. Professor Hart is content to designate criteria for the identifica-
tion of legal rules (which he proceeds to divide somewhat obscurely into
"primary" and "secondary") 2' and then to suggest that penumbral cases
are decided by excursions into the realms of justice and morality. Now
it is true that the law can in some fashion be reduced to a body of rules,
as indeed happens with collected editions of the statutes or with such
works as the Restatement. But every law student quickly discovers (if he
ever thought to the contrary) that he does not come to a law school to
learn the content of these volumes, and it is a familiar clich6 that no
lawyer can know very much of the law. The tasks of law teaching are to
impart sophistication in techniques of argument and reasoning. For this
purpose, and for the elucidation of a legal system, we must add to the
concepts of duty-imposing and power-conferring rules the notion of can-
21. A good discussion of the difficulties that surround this distinction made by Hart
is to be found in Sartorius, The Concept of Law, 52 ARncivas roR PHLOSOPHY OF L.
SocIAL PHILOSOPHY 161, 164.68 (1966).
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ons or standards of interpretation which serve more than one purpose.
Sometimes, especially when contained in a statute, they function partly
as a public justification of the enactment or as a declamatory statement
of legislative policy. More often they are directives to officials, particu-
larly judges, as to how they should work with the prescriptive rules of
the system. When developed by the judges themselves in the form of
principles, maxims and aphorisms they are a declaration of the shared
understanding of craftsmen about how they should shape the materials
on which they work. But, by their very nature, these interpretive direc-
tives are often capable of expression within the scope of a duty-imposing
or power-creating rule, and for this reason it is not profitable to attempt
to split them off and reserve the title "law" for statements of pure pre-
scription. Such an attempt would serve no useful purpose for, both by
the criteria of formal validity and functional importance, such judg-
ment standards meet the same tests as purely prescriptive statements.
The concept of a rule is thus too narrow to explain the variety of ma-
terial contained within a legal system. It may usefully identify the "law
points" around which legal argument swirls. In this way the concept of
a rule is certainly a necessary part of the elucidation of the nature of a le-
gal system. But it is inadequate as a vehicle for an explanation of the na-
ture of legal reasoning which, as we have seen, is necessary for an eluci-
dation of the central operation of decision-making.
V.
For these reasons the American realist movement is in some ways
a more fruitful and hopeful jurisprudential school than that of the mod-
em analytical positivists. One careful reservation must be made on this
comment. It is not meant as a denigration of the technique of sophisti-
cated linguistic analysis, which is an invaluable weapon for attacking all
problems of law and all questions of legal philosophy. The criticism is
not directed at that technique but rather at the emphasis in such writers
as Kelsen and Professor Hart on the centrality of the concepts of norm
or rule. Such a monocular concentration has inevitably led to a lack of
focus on the decision-making process. The American realists, although
guilty of some crude analytical blunders, did perceive that the impor-
tance of the process of decision-making and also that the concept of a
rule was of little help in its elucidation. The realist fallacy lay in the
preoccupation with explaining the causes of decisions in a sociological
or psychological context and in the inability to distinguish between mo-
tivation and argument. The need now is to return to a concentration on
decision-making with an awareness of this distinction.
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Such an endeavor might have as a highly desirable by-product the
clarification of the uses of legal philosophy in a law school curriculum.
Jurisprudence, as the subject tends unhappily to be styled in the United
States, occupies an exotic and barely tolerated role in the great majority
of American law schools, and it is not hard to understand why this
should be so. The general exercises in analysis of the concept of law by
the more celebrated of the modem positivist jurists, such as Kelsen and
Hart, are rightly seen to be of little or no help in increasing our under-
standing of the workings of a legal system. The realists have produced
no general sociology of law that deserves to be ranked as an academic
discipline, and it is probably still correct to say that the sociological
background and implications of legal subject matter are best displayed
interstitially in the presentation of particular legal subjects. As long as
jurisprudence is thought of as a separate body of knowledge, as a subject
in the same sense that corporation law and criminal law are subjects, its
low estate is inevitable. But its proper place and its value should be ap-
parent once its role is restated as a technique for studying concepts, as a
technique for studying a special kind of reasoning and decision-making,
as a technique for studying techniques. Doing law is always to be argu-
ing and deciding. All law teaching, in any field, is a business of arguing
and studying argument and decisions. If the major contribution of legal
philosophy to law is a concentrated study of argument, reasoning and
decision-making, then of course it must be acknowledged that no lawyer
or law teacher could ever avoid doing legal philosophy at some time or
other in his professional activity. For if working with law is a kind of
practical reasoning, then all who do it are likely to reflect from time to
time on the nature of what they are doing. In that sense we have been
doing legal philosophy all the time without knowing it.
But there is room, indeed an important need, for a more systematic
and detached'examination of the special characteristics of that type of
practical reasoning that is found in law. Legal argument has a great deal
in common with general moral and ethical argument, but it has too its
very special features which stem from the more or less authoritative
quality of the materials deployed and its professional and technical tra-
ditions. There is not enough time to study and expound such features in
the traditional, technical areas of a law school curriculum, but if they
are not studied, legal education is at best haphazard and at worst a fail-
ure. In this way, radical as the suggestion may be to American ears, legal
philosophy has a stronger claim than any other area to a compulsory
place in the law school curriculum.
Such a view is perhaps particularly appropriate at present, when the
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American public scene is troubled by sharply conflicting views not only
about the wisdom of certain judicial decisions but also indeed about the
very propriety of the techniques used in reaching them. The relation-
ship between the concepts of law and policy is not an arid or recherch6
concern of the legal philosopher, but a matter of vigorous public debate
and unease. No pretension can be made that anything said in this article
provides a resolution of that debate, but perhaps a signpost to the solu-
tion has been raised. The indispensable prerequisite is a realization that
"law" and "policy" are not contiguous territories suitable for border
raids and frontier violations. Policy is almost always to some extent ar-
ticulated in law. Sometimes it speaks with a very clear voice in the most
formal of legal materials; sometimes it is muted or muffled and has to be
amplified and clarified through a process of pursuit that leads us out
through layers of less formal legal material into a realm of discourse
where authoritative prescriptions have receded into the background.
Choices will have to be made at many points along the path to clarifica-
tion, and they are choices which deserve to be examined by criteria
which are a blend of the standards used in everyday, non-legal decision-
making and the special, technical and intellectual traditions of the legal
profession.
All this could perhaps be summarized by saying that Professor Hart's
picture of a legal system is curiously unprofessional. There is a world of
special expertise between a rule and a decision, and the most practical
and fruitful task of legal philosophy is its study. There are rules in the
law and there is law in rules, but one needs special tools to dig it out,
and these tools are as centrally important and as worthy of examination
as the rules themselves.22
22. It is remarkable how very little useful work has been done in legal philosophy on
the nature of legal reasoning and decision-making. Some very penetrating observations were
made by the unjustly neglected American legal scholar, John Dickinson, particularly in
two of his articles, Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79
U. PA. L. REv. 853 (1931); Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79
U. PA. L. REv. 1052 (1931). A great deal of illuminating material is to be found in K.
LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMoN I-Aw TRADrIoN: DEcmiNG ArP '.&s (1960), though, in the realist
tradition, Llewellyn always seems more interested in providing a scheme for predicting
decisions than in analyzing a structure of argument. O late there has been an awakening
of interest in this subject in continental Europe under the stimulation of the important
work done by Professor Perelman of the University of Brussels. See C. PERE.zAN & L.
OLBRanCrs-TYrcA, TRAU-s DE LARGumNTATioN: LA NouvELLE ReljrouQtE (1958) and the
collection of essays LA THdo=u DE L'ARGUwENTATION (1963). There are signs now in the
American literature of an awareness that the concept of a rule is inadequate for an anal)sis
of legal reasoning. See Singer, Hart's Concept of Law, 60 J. PmLosoPRY 197, 210 (1963).
A very valuable contribution is Dworkin, judicial Discretion, 60 J. PiaLosopait 624 (1963),
though Professor Dworkin's approach perhaps overemphasizes the similarities bet.veen legal
and moral argument and does not take sufficient account of the special technical and
profesional characteristics of legal reasoning.
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